


FHIR API
Fine-grained security brainstorming
22/01/2020

Current situation (01/2020)



Current situation:

- FHIR API has been built *before* the Claim module: GQL API - and the nested security - was not there at the time
- FHIR API was initially dedicated to (system) **integration** (between *trusted* apps). The security (authentication & authorization) level was not foreseen to be at user level...


User identity (authentication)

In openIMIS backend, the authentication is based on the REMOTE_USER HTTP header

and this is the reason to  NEVER  expose backend “straight” to outside

Usage examples:


Session (cookie)-based
(current frontend way)



Notes:

- the cookie is set by the legacy openIMIS login
- the session is created 'intercepting' the legacy login


Basic auth-based
(current fhir-api way)



Note:

Instead of a basic auth, the external app could be forwarding a SSO token (or X.509 certificate,...) of a (openIMIS) trusted authority

Connection vs. payload identity
(current fhir-api way)



Notes:

- Instead of a HTTP header (visible from outside), we can be transferring identity in message payload (FHIR 'provenance' ?)
- The basic-auth can be replaced by 2 way SSL certificates,...

User identity (authentication)

In any cases, the identities ('logins') must be agreed upon before the call

...or we can have an '**auto-provisioning**' mechanism: when the request with/for a not yet known user, a user is automatically added to (legacy) openIMIS (in tblUsers).

In openIMIS, there are '**interactive**' and '**technical**':

- **Technical** users are NOT defined in tblUsers and receive their rights ONLY via the (django default) groups/permissions (django rules,...)
- **Interactive** users are defined in tblUsers (legacy openIMIS) table and receive all 'legacy' rights from the 'legacy' roles/rights (in addition to django groups/permissions)

openIMIS first try to match user as an interactive user

... and "falls back" on a technical user

User identity... extended

Depending on chosen security token format (or agreed user header/payload section), the identity can be 'extended' with some 'profile attributes' (like roles... or even 'the HF the user belongs to',...).

This is especially handy for a fine-grained auto-provisioning (beware of the updates/revoke flows!)

... but requires the various apps (or the token authority) to agree (know) the various attributes (roles,...) used by openIMIS (i.e. tblRoles/tblRights,...).

Objective: completely 'outsource' the user management to an external system (AD, LDAP,...)

Authorization: endpoint security

Every (backend) module:


- can expose any new endpoints (/routes/URLs)... and, in the reference gateway, there is (today) no 'filtering' on accessed routes (the gateway only check the access to the openIMIS 'as a whole')
- can connect to the database (via the exposed django 'models')

As a consequence, by default, every module must perform the authorization part:

- is the user allowed to connect to that endpoint (a.k.a. 'feature')?
- can the user access that specific resource (claim,...)?
- ...


Towards central authorization

Provided that we don't "allow" (pure convention) modules to use the other modules' models straight, we could be enforcing a central resource-based authorization



Central authorization alternatives

A. Re-use the fine-grained security implemented in GQL API



Instead of Claim (model) object use ClaimGraphQLType (that wraps Claim), and [execute GQL queries](#) (and mutations) straight

```

78 class Claim(core.models.VersionedModel):
79     id = models.AutoField(db_column='ClaimID', primary_key=True)
80     uuid = models.CharField(db_column='ClaimUUID',
81                             max_length=36, default=uuid.uuid4, unique=True)
82     category = models.CharField(
83         db_column='ClaimCategory', max_length=1, blank=True, null=True)
84     insurer = models.ForeignKey(
85         insurree_models.Insurree, models.DO_NOTHING, db_column='InsurreeID')
86     code = models.CharField(db_column='ClaimCode', max_length=8, unique=True)
87     date_from = fields.DateField(db_column='DateFrom')
88     date_to = fields.DateField(db_column='DateTo', blank=True, null=True)
89     status = models.SmallIntegerField(db_column='ClaimStatus')
90     adjuster = models.ForeignKey(
91         core.models.Interactiveliver, models.DO_NOTHING,
92         db_column='Adjuster', blank=True, null=True)
93     adjustment = models.TextField(
94         db_column='Adjustment', blank=True, null=True)
95     claimed = models.DecimalField(
96         db_column='Claimed',
97         max_digits=18, decimal_places=2, blank=True, null=True)
98     approved = models.DecimalField(
99         db_column='Approved',
100        max_digits=18, decimal_places=2, blank=True, null=True)
101     reinsured = models.DecimalField(
102        db_column='Reinsured',
103        max_digits=18, decimal_places=2, blank=True, null=True)
104     valuated = models.DecimalField(
105        db_column='Valuated', max_digits=18, decimal_places=2, blank=True, null=True)
106     date_claimed = fields.DateField(db_column='DateClaimed')
107     data_reinsured = fields.DateField(

```


```

55 class ClaimGraphQLType(DjangoObjectType):
56     """
57     Main element for a Claim. It can contain items and/or services.
58     The filters are possible on BatchRun, Insurree, HealthFacility, Admin and ICD in addition to the Claim fields
59     themselves.
60     """
61     attachments_count = graphene.Int()
62     client_mutation_id = graphene.String()
63
64     class Meta:
65         model = Claim
66         exclude_fields = ('row_id',)
67         interfaces = (graphene.relay.Node,)
68         filter_fields = {
69             "uuid": ["exact"],
70             "code": ["exact", "istartswith", "icontains", "iexact"],
71             "status": ["exact"],
72             "date_claimed": ["exact", "lt", "lte", "gt", "gte"],
73             "date_from": ["exact", "lt", "lte", "gt", "gte"],
74             "date_to": ["exact", "lt", "lte", "gt", "gte"],
75             "feedback_status": ["exact"]

```


Central authorization alternatives

B. Implement a ‘service’ (or API) layer in each module (to encapsulate the fine-grained security)...




Either:

- we leave Claim GQL as is (and security is duplicated)
- ... or we **switch Claim GQL to Claim API calls** but lose the beauty/flexibility of Graphene/django integration (graph ‘navigation’ in queries,...) ... which is also “bound” to the contribution mechanism in UI (contributed ‘projections’,...)

Central authorization alternatives

C. Move the fine-grained security in a 'middleware', wrapping the model for all modules (and the model's module too)



Alternatives comparison

	Pros	Cons
A. Re-use GQL API	<p>Nothing to change in Claim module.</p> <p>GQL mutations reused (and the associated audit mechanism).</p>	<p>Requires FHIR module (and others) to manipulate GQLTypes (instead of the raw django models), the GQL Mutations (for the create/update/delete),...</p>
B. Service layer as inter-module API	<p>'Traditional' approach, API could probably even be exposed 'straight' in JSON/XML/...</p>	<p>Requires to design (less flexible) and implement (\$-🕒) the service layer</p> <p>Either we change Claim GQL to use the Claim API... or we duplicate security (within Claim module)</p>
C. Wrap django model	<p>Keep current 'straight-to-model' flexibility (both for GQL, FHIR... and any other module)</p>	<p>\$-🕒 ? Needs to be investigated (existing middleware libs or do we have to build our own, compatibility with django-rules ?,...)</p>